The forced march to Bilad al-Sham (Syria).
“The administration of US President Barack Obama will continue to push for a resolution that includes the option of military action if Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government fails to adhere to the US-Russian plan to place Syria’s chemical weapons under international control for eventual destruction…” (Source)
This will then probably be the main line of the planned appearance by Barack Obama in front of the UN General Assembly on September 24.
Under consideration of these deadlines, it is obvious that this resolution is much longer prepared and elaborated than any of the previous resolutions – this is not surprising, since the previous resolutions, submitted to the UN Security Council (UNSC), were from the outset only maculation to be rejected by the votes at the UNSC, and it served the West for nothing else than to once more prove the “rigid attitude of Russia”.
This time, everything is different and so it lasts. Already in Geneva, the respective experts and the foreign ministers of the United States and Russia have needed 4 days for the arrangements. The intensity of the work actually suggests that it is very likely that the next resolution will come through.
The pronouncements of the Americans about the absolutely necessary to include the threat of violence can be put aside for the time being – at the moment, this is only about their desires and to exercise a certain pressure. But one should not fool himself, of course.
Both the U.S. and Russia are out to achieve something now. The respective veto right remains unchanged, but to use it doesn`t correspond with the interests of 4 of the 5 veto powers (except for the silent China).
However, the Chinese voting behaviour at the UN Security Council (UNSC) has a certain tradition – to not just vote against something that does not affect China directly. Therefore, one can assume that China will at least abstain from voting when the others have agreed.
A veto against the upcoming resolution would be a fiasco to all previous efforts, and it will reflect in (condense on) the reputation of Barack Obama as well on Vladimir Putin. The next week will be crucial for the situation in and around Syria.
It’s not just about the still hanging in the air “surgical” attack by the Americans, but also about the practical implementation of what will be provided by the resolution – and the implementation means an inevitable intervention of other states in the internal affairs of Syria.
The Chemical Weapons Arsenal must be removed and this seems hardly conceivable without a certain contingent of foreign personnel. Then it is not far to seek that there will be massive or less massive attacks of uncontrollable terror brigades against the quota – and presto / shazam – it becomes one of the conflict parties.
Here, it is estimated to be about a magnitude that Putin has indicated in his relatively loose phrase at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club: he factual rejects it to just see a one hundred percent guarantee that Syria fulfils the obligations, which it has taken on itself. Then there is the slightly strange, though even explicitly “hypothetical and theoretical” remark by Ivanov that Assad could “cheat”, and then…
In any case, Russia is quite clearly preparing the ground to dish a whole system of guarantees that Syria exactly adheres to the demands of the foreseeable resolution. The only thing that would represent such a tangible guarantee is the participation of foreign quotas for the securing the chemical weapons and the objects on which they exist. So far, there is apparently no consensus on who will exactly send his people to Syria, and Russia understands the danger and the risk of such a step very well, which is why a justification for their own participation is gradually rightly placed in the above-mentioned phrases.
A possible presence of Russian troops is not an overly favourable development of the situation, but it would be an outright disaster if even NATO staff would be used in Syria under the guise of “securing the Chemical Weapons” (let`s say the Turks, for example).
In this case, it may come, despite all difficulty of such a decision, to a repetition of the Russian force march (Footslog) to Pristina. What the President and the Head of the Presidential Administration had let it known, fits in any case to such a development. Russia has already been in such a situation in the course of recent history, and knows well how such situations can develop.
The “Georgia war” of 08.08.2008 was basically broken out under the pretext that the local Russian peacekeepers became a party in the conflict, because they were said to have supported Ossetia. In truth, it was in such cases about the prevention of provocations by the Georgian side, however, they were simply out to activate the peacekeeping troops and thus to create a reason for the attack on Tskhinvali.
So, one has not to doubt that an eventually Russian presence in Syria (the presence of another country is currently hard to imagine) will be used analogously. The difference to South Ossetia is, however, that there is not only the Roki Tunnel (Roksky Tunnel) between Russia and Syria, and that the Georgian troops in Tskhinvali, who were more reminiscent of a criminal Corps, look like guinea pigs compared to the al-Nusra brigades. One has to remember the fatwa of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. What a motivation!
However, the main problem is a bit bigger. As every problem, this has also a name: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
On 21 August 2013, this political actually third-rate country has plunged the region, perhaps even the world, into a crisis and in the risk of a major regional conflict, whose development was not foreseeable.
Nobody can let pass such things by anyone – and this has nothing to do with justice. It is rather a very simple caution – if one let the Saudis (Saud) get away with this, then one creates precedents and the provocations will continue. Perhaps on an even larger scale.
While it is clear that nobody will bombard Riyadh, it is also hardly conceivable that someone will secretly potter around at the drip of the King at night. But the outlines of what could be started, can be seen, for example, in the recent statement by the Iranian President Hassan Rohani (Rouhani).
He mentioned Bahrain certainly not just so in his op-ed in the “Washington Post”:
“First, we must join hands to constructively work toward national dialogue, whether in Syria or Bahrain. We must create an atmosphere where peoples of the region can decide their own fates. As part of this, I announce my government’s readiness to help facilitate dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition.”
The disempowerment of the al-Khalifa (House of Khalifa), who are just able to stay in the saddle by the Saudi army and de facto occupation, could be the beginning of its own disaster for Saudi Arabia.
Without a proper punishment of the al-Saud, any plans by the Obamas, Putins, and Rohanis are hanging in the air of uncertainty, and if the talks between Barack Obama and Hassan Rohani (Rouhani) have the effect that Iran gets a little free hand on the Arabian Peninsula, then this is in the interest of all.
Anyway, what’s just happening in New York can probably be well regarded as the highest art of diplomacy and international politics.
There has hardly ever been such a situation as now in Syria. The diplomats of the participants pull an all-nighter, are working on plans and variants, while they know that 90 percent of this will be maculation soon – It won’t be long until the likely adoption of the resolution.