Egypt and the Islamic loans – Egypt manoeuvres itself more and more into the situation of the late USSR. President Mursi (Morsi) nimbly takes out loans and debts. Meanwhile, there is also a so-called “Islamic loan” (Islamic economic jurisprudence), an interest-free loan, of 2 billion U.S. dollars from the neighbouring Libya for Egypt.
Qatar had previously made $ 2.5 billion available for Egypt, and puts another 3 billion in prospect. Besides, Egypt negotiates with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) over almost 5 billion. That’s almost a late socialist pace.
Although Egypt is not really a poor country. It produces oil and natural gas, it has the ownership of one of the most important transportation hubs in the world – the Suez Canal – and Egypt looks like a very solid borrower.
The most of the current loans are taken out of necessity and for immediate consumption. The short-term object of these loans and debts is clear: Reduction of the acute social tensions in Egypt. But such a treatment of the disease looks like if somebody wants to transform this current acute status into a chronic condition at top speed.
In the end, Egypt will likely be forced after the inclusion of such hardly to be handled loans to divest itself of its assets and to cede its national resources, its industry and other important sources of income to the creditors. There is still no state power in Egypt, not only in the nominal sense of this word.
The elites are divided, the revolution still haunts through the consciousness of the masses. Under such circumstances, it will hardly be possible to guarantee that the loan funds will not simply and easy disappear in dark channels.
So far, the policy of the Egyptian government led the country directly and without detour into the disaster. A breakdown of the most populous country in North Africa and the Middle East will certainly trigger some major effects, and in in comparison of those of the entire “Arab Spring” with all its “revolutions” and wars, those may then be seen as a summer dream.
Another detail about the mood in the country: The 15-day period of the anew arrest of Hosni Mubarak ends soon. This is a formal legal matter – the case against him has gone into appeal, the former judgment has been lifted, therefore, the arrest must be limited. This formality is able to slip from a legal into a political matter, which is able to trigger a new wave of unrest.
The judge who should preside over the trial against Mubarak has thrown in the towel quickly, and the authorities are now faced with a dilemma – either they act contrary to the law and detain Mubarak longer, or they risk further unrests. Neither the one nor the other is actually acceptable.
The third force in Egypt, namely the nomenclature of the former government of Mubarak, become more and more confident when it comes to discredit the current rulers and they seem to manoeuvre in seemingly hopeless situations. It is always neat when the “revolutionary” break down each other’s heads, always riots flare up, instability is there, which can be dosed and regulated and eventually, at the appropriate time, when “everything” is at a needed level, a return to the lever of power becomes then quite realistic.
The only question is: who really wants to be in power in Egypt? Any leader will have quickly to address hundreds of problems, which had partly accumulated even before the “Egyptian revolution” but have then pushed the country in the intervening two years of anarchy further in the direction of a coma, in the current catastrophic situation in Egypt.
Nevertheless, the old guard will not disappear so easily. It looks a bit as if they try to create some strings around the Muslim Brotherhood, which they then can use every now and then, so that the latter will never think about the idea to “touch” the privileges and property of the “aristocracy” from the days of Mubarak. But if the “brothers” (Muslim Brotherhood) are not able to understand those hints, however, there may be more pressure and in the end, there could be an attempt to take back the power.